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Friedrich Nietzsche cautioned "Stare not into the Abyss, lest the Abyss stare back
at you." In light of the "war on terrorism" and real threats to national security, the
satellite community is faced with few choices but to reorganize and refocus.
Problems that for decades plagued the nation's critical infrastructure now haunt
the work of scientists and technicians that design, manufacture and implement the
equipment supporting satellites. The increased importance of these networked
systems has been neglected.
Intelligence on terrorist networks and their interest in destabilizing the economies
of the Western world have not been matched by increased understanding of how
they might cripple our communication networks. Efforts to enhance intelligence
gathering and the government's need to regulate the security of commercial and
privately owned assets have raised difficult questions. Balancing the genuine
needs of national security and the protection of corporate liberties so rooted in
democratic traditions will strain industry resources during the 21st century.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report in October 2002 warning
that the nation's commercial satellites have been largely ignored in discussions of
critical infrastructure protection and are vulnerable to attack from hackers. Amid
heightened concerns about security is the knowledge that space-based
communication platforms are also at risk. Terrorists just might divert their current
preoccupation with the aviation industry to attempting to bring down our
communications networks.
The GAO report entitled "Critical Infrastructure Protection: Commercial Satellite
Security Should Be More Fully Addressed," was completed in August 2002. It
found critical vulnerabilities in the nation's commercial satellite network and
suggested that federal agencies using commercial satellites may be exposing
sensitive data to unauthorized intrusion. The infiltration or destruction of
commercial satellites would literally bring the economy of the world to a
screeching halt. More than a year has passed and little has been accomplished.
Westerners simply take the system for granted. The nation has been riveted by the
more publicized threat to aviation.
A previous editor to the Online Journal of Space Communication wrote, "Our 21st
Century global economy has its strengths and weaknesses. Positively speaking,
we have the technology and know-how to do almost anything. Limitations are
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primarily in terms of economics, politics, societal factors, and education." The
dangers and realities of terrorism, however, dampen the bright future that
technology can offer with the grim prospect of destruction of parts of the system
or even worse the whole array.
Despite using encryption to shield communications and physical security to
harden ground stations, federal agencies depend on commercial satellite service
providers to make available security for tracking, telemetry and control links,
satellites and satellite control stations. However, those procedures fall well short
of the standards the government uses to secure the military and intelligence
satellite network and satellites used in its Global Positioning System.
Federal laws governing satellite system security apply only to satellites used for
national security. As a result, government agencies cannot impose specific
security requirements on satellite service providers whose equipment is used for
other purposes. Sometimes, those commercial entities see issues of security as
those that belong on the bottom of the budgetary "to do" list.
The GAO report notes the increased importance of satellite communications to
the nation's information infrastructure, and the increasing dependence of the
federal government on commercial satellites. Traffic from federal agencies
already makes up a significant amount of traffic handled by commercial satellites,
and up to 45% of all federal government traffic between the Persian Gulf region
and the U.S. is carried over commercial satellite networks. The report
recommends expanding the current federal policy governing satellite security to
cover commercial satellites used by government agencies.
It also recommends practical ways to better secure commercial satellite
communications, such as scrambling telemetry tracking and control
communications using cryptography or spread spectrum communications,
improving the security of satellites with attack-resistant components, ensuring
redundancy in communications networks to guard against the loss of one or more
satellites and better securing ground stations. Clearly, the nation's policymakers
and industry professionals should take a close look at the findings and consider
including commercial satellites as part of the nation's critical infrastructure.
This issue of the Online Journal of Space Communication focuses on matters
related to the security of these systems, the laws pertaining to them, the
weaponization of space and the potential for infiltration of current systems.
Kathleen Sweet, M.A., J.D., Lt. Col (Ret) USAF
Associate Professor
Department of Security, Intelligence and Globalization
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
2300 Willow Creek Road
Prescott, Arizona 86301-3720

https://ohioopen.library.ohio.edu/spacejournal/vol3/iss6/1

2

Sweet: Issue 6: From the Guest Editor

Tel: +1 928 445 5173
Email: smsweet@rmsecgroup.com

Published by OHIO Open Library, 2021

3

